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Christine Boyle The Role of the Judiciary in
the Work of Madame Justice
Wilson*
L Introduction
I was delighted to be invited to speak at this conference, for a variety
of reasons. Firstly, I admire and respect the work of the guest of
honour. Secondly, I feel a Celtic connection with the Scottish theme,
having grown up in Northern Ireland. Thirdly, it is a great pleasure of
course to come home to Dalhousie.
The theme of the conference is a little ironic, given the fact that the
concept of the democratic intellect is coupled with Madame Justice
Wilson. Part of what was meant by the democratic intellect was that
education should not be limited to a certain privileged class. John Reid
tells us that, in laying the cornerstone of Dalhousie College in 1820,
the Earl of Dalhousie declared that "this College of Halifax is...formed
in imitation of the University of Edinburgh; its doors will be open to
all who profess the Christian religion.., to all, in short, who may be
disposed to devote a small part of their time to study." ' But in 1820,
the word "all" did not include women, among others, and Madame
Justice Wilson would not have been permitted to study here in those
days. Women were not to be "enlightened" in Scotland either for some
time after this, the Scottish legal system, like other legal systems,
struggling to exclude women from the benefits of higher education.
2
In 1869, Sophia Jex-Blake and six other women, known as the
Edinburgh 7, were not allowed to study at the Edinburgh Medical
School. Lord Neaves, a member of the full bench of the Scottish Court
of Session which heard their appeal, was of the view that the admis-
sion of women would "deteriorate our Universities in a way unknown
to any period of their history. '3
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1. John G. Reid, "Beyond the Democratic Intellect: The Scottish Example and University
Reform in Canada's Maritime Provinces, 1870 -1933", in P. Axelrod and J.G. Reid, Youth
University and Canadian Society Essays in the Social History of Higher Education (Kingston,
Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989), at 278.
2. Thus it is not surprising that, as far as I can tell, there are only male jurists, even in the
twentieth century, in David M.Walker, The Scottish Jurists, (Edinburgh: W.Green & Son Ltd.,
1985). Scottish jurist is defined, at 5, as a "man who has devoted his energies" etc.
3. See T.Brettel Dawson, Relating to Law: A Chronology of Women and Law in Canada, (North
York, Ont: Captus Press, 1990), at 6.
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At the same time, from 1868, Scottish universities had the right to
return two Members to Parliament.4 "[P]ersons of full age and not
subject to legal incapacity" who were members of the General Coun-
cils of the universities were given the franchise. Leah Leneman has
researched the story of the denial of that franchise to women, and the
following is based on her account.5 Women began to have access to
universities in 1892. In 1906, 5 women graduates applied for voting
papers and were refused. In true feminist tradition they sued the
bastards. Lord Salvesen initially heard the case. It would have been
disappointing, I suppose, if he had not said something daft and sure
enough he did. Incapacity to vote "'did not arise from any underrating
of the sex either in intellect or worth' [quoting Mr. Justice Willes] but
was an exemption founded on motives of decorum and was a privilege
of the sex."
Sometimes we are afraid of using present standards unfairly to
judge people of former times. However, lots of people would have
disagreed with such a view at the time. One writer in a women's
suffrage journal responded that "[s]uch speeches ought only to be
delivered to the diplodocus in the Natural History Museum".
However, the decision was upheld on appeal to the Court of
Session. There had been concern that women would create a scene
when the decision was handed down, but this did not occur. One court
official said that the "ladies behaved like gentlemen". The case went
next to the House of Lords6 but was lost again, the court wondering
how there was room for argument. In fact there was a good argument,
directly connected with The Democratic Intellect, the theme of this
conference. The appellants argued that the franchise was here not
based on property or geographical location but on an "intellectual"
test - a kind of intellectual democracy.
The point of this story is that there are at least some signs that the
democratic intellect was not exactly democratic and did not always
value intellect. In honouring Madame Justice Wilson I would like to
4. One famous M.P. for the Scottish universities was John Buchan, Lord Tweedsmuir, later
Governor General of Canada and author of The Thirty Nine Steps. See Madame Justice Wilson,
"Literature and the Law", Shumiatcher lecture delivered at the University of Saskatchewan,
March 13, 1987, at 35.
5. Leah Leneman "When Women Were Not 'Persons': The Scottish Women Graduates' Case,
1906-08", (1991) (Part 1-April) The Juridical Review 109.
6. Two of the appellants, Chrystal Macmillan and Frances Simson, argued the case themselves,
and there was a big reception for industrial and professional women in the Queens Hall
afterwards. Chrystal Macmillan wrote in a letter later that it was "inspiring to have thousands of
people cheer and wave for two or three minutes before they let one begin to speak...."
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honour the centuries of women who would have been her judicial
predecessors, whose intellect is lost to us and whose judgments she
would no doubt have valued.
My topic is the role of the judiciary in the work of Madame Justice
Wilson, but I am going to use a particular focus. I started with the
famous lecture "Do Women Judges Really Make a Difference" deliv-
ered at Osgoode Hall Law School7 and it helped me think of a
question. What is it that women judges might make a difference to?
One answer is the law, another is judging itself. These themes were
very clear in Madame Justice Wilson's lecture. Another answer, how-
ever, is the concept of woman. When women judges make a differ-
ence to law, part of what they might make a difference to is law's
contributions to the cultural meaning of womanhood. (The law does
not of course do the job of making us women ( and those of us who are
men, men) alone - she is very much aware of the relatively minor role
of law.8 There are other influences, including religion and education.
A focus on what it means to be a woman does not take us away
from the topic of the role of the judiciary. Madame Justice Wilson has
made it crystal clear that the qualities of being womanly and judicial
are not mutually exclusive. We may have indeed moved from an age
when it seemed inconceivable that one could be a judge and a woman
too to a time when more attention is being paid, via judicial education
programmes, to the question that many conscientious judges struggle
with - how to combine maleness and judging.
In addressing Madame Justice Wilson's role as a judge in contrib-
uting to the legal construction of woman, I'd like to start by asking
whether the word woman changes the meaning of the word judge.
H. Woman Judge
I can detect at least two schools of thought. Judicial qualities could be
seen as gender-neutral. Thus gender has nothing to do with being a
judge, and the cultural figure of the judge has not been constructed as
7. The Fourth Annual Barbara Betcherman Lecture, 1990, reprinted by the Society for the
Reform of the Criminal Law.
8. In "Law in Society - The Principle of Sexual Equality", speech delivered in Winnipeg,
Manitoba, April 8, 1983, she discusses the role of school, family and religion in constructing the
meaning of gender and of attitudes toward sexual equality. For instance, she states, at 10, that
"[r]esearch on picture books and school readers also discloses this kind of stereotyping of
masculine and feminine characteristics to which the child is exposed from an early age. Indeed,
by the time they reach 5 or6years old children are already conscious of the superior value placed
on masculinity in our society."
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masculine. It just so happens that in the Canadian legal system judges
have been male in the past, and the inexorable increase in the number
of women lawyers will in the fullness of time produce a gender-
balanced judiciary. However that will not mean any change in the
concept of judge itself. From this perspective, the phrase "women
judges" is a superfluous and perhaps even rude reference to the bodies
that some judges just happen to have, as pointless as say a reference to
short judges or bald judges, or judges who did not attend Dalhousie
law school.
The contrasting perspective is that the word woman is not super-
fluous. Thus the appointment of women to the bench is changing the
meaning of judging itself. One's sex is not like baldness or shortness,
if only for the simple reason that we do not have a history of laws
which excluded such people from the legal profession. A gender-
balanced judiciary will not just affect things like public confidence
and increase fairness for the individual women in the legal profession,
but will cause more fundamental change.
The view that 'woman' could change 'judge' could take two obvi-
ous and different forms. On the one hand the phrase "women judges"
could form part of the sentence, a sentence I have actually heard
spoken in British Columbia, "Women judges have no place in the
Supreme Court of Canada." The other view is that woman could
change what it means to be a judge in a positive way, could enrich the
function of judging in a way of which people could be proud.9
The judge who may be most associated in the public mind with the
latter view is Madame Justice Wilson. Although there is much debate
within feminist communities about the pros and cons of her decisions,
she is clearly linked with the idea that women judges could make a
difference. In her speech, she does not only suggest that women
judges could make a difference to such substantive areas as criminal
(though interestingly not contract) law, she goes on to discuss the idea
that women will have an impact on the process of judging itself.
In her views on judging she can be clearly located in the general
intellectual debates of her time. A significant example in this context
is that she thinks there is merit in the theories of Carol Gilligan on
moral development. In her influential but controversial book, In a
Different Voice, 0 Gilligan discusses the dominant moral ideology
9. See generally Isabel Grant and Lynn Smith, "Gender Representation in the Canadian
Judiciary" in Appointing Judges: Philosophy, Politics and Practice, (Toronto: Ontario Law
Reform Commission, 1991), at 57.
10. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). There is an extensive body of literature, using and
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(which can be expressed in judgments of course, as well as elsewhere)
as involving a conception of self as individuated, autonomous, and
independent, and as conceptualising community relationships as con-
tractual, competitive, and adversarial." She contrasts that with a
different moral voice, not necessarily female, though heard through
women's voices in her research, which stresses the conception of self
as interconnected and relational. Such a conception favours intimacy
and sensitivity to the needs of others. There are various ways of
describing this contrast: morality of rights - morality of responsibility;
ethic of justice - ethic of care; self defined through separation -self
defined through connection.
An approach to judging based on ideas of responsibility, care and
connection might well produce a different process as well as different
substantive rules, in the words of Madame Justice Wilson herself:
"The goal, according to women's ethical sense, is not seen in terms of
winning or losing but rather in terms of achieving an optimum out-
come for all individuals involved in the moral dilemma."'" I should
stress that these ideas, of linkage between women and an ethic of care,
are quite controversial among feminists. 13 However, I think it is fair to
say that Wilson joins with others in the legal profession in finding
Gilligan's ideas, sometimes referred to as cultural feminism, influen-
tial. This kind of thinking has points of intersection with the vocabu-
lary of communitarianism, with its emphasis on the role of communi-
ties in a person's identity. 4
Another way in which 'woman' might change 'judge' is that there
may be considerable emphasis on the background to a legal issue. She
suggests that judges have to try "to enter into the skin of the litigant
and make his or her experience part of your experience and only when
you have done that, to judge."' 5 This is consistent with a continuing
emphasis in the feminist and critical approaches to law generally on
the importance of context. Law already makes use of contextualized
critiquing her ideas. See, e.g. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations
on Women's Lawyering Process" (1985), 1 Berkeley Women's LJ. 39, and Joan M. Shaughnessy,
"Gilligan's Travels" (1988), 7 Law and Inequality 1.
11. See generally Richard Devlin, "Nomos and Thanatos(Part B). Feminism as Jurisgenerative
Transformation, or Resistance Through Partial Incorporation?" (1990), 35 DaILJ. 123, at 151.
12. Supra, note 7, at 10.
13. See, e.g. Catharine A.MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press), at 51, and Devlin, supra 11, at 148-185.
14. See Donna Greschner, "Feminist Concerns with the New Communitarians: We Don't Need
Another Hero" in Allan Hutchinson and Lea Green, eds. Law and the Community: The End of
Individualism, (Toronto: Carswell, 1989).
15. Supra, note 7, at 10.
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reasoning, since legal issues are often debated in the context of the
facts of a particular case. Judging is, to a certain extent, an exercise in
contextualized reasoning, and administrative decision-making struc-
tures may result from an effort to institutionalise context. However,
feminist theory teaches us that gender might be part of the context of
some legal issues and teaches us to be suspicious of a level of abstrac-
tion which ignores gendered patterns in the real world. Madame
Justice Wilson has been instrumental in putting such ideas on the
national stage.
Lavalleel6 may be the best-known example of an attempt to take an
approach in which gender is not abstracted out of the context. Angelique
Lyn Lavallee was a woman who was acquitted of murder after shoot-
ing her abusive common law partner in the back of the head. In
developing the principles of self-defence, the Supreme Court paid
attention to the social, economic, historical and psychological context.
Thus expert evidence was admitted on the battered woman syndrome,
and the majority took judicial notice of the myths associated with
battered women. This kind of approach had an obvious substantive
impact. The Court abandoned the requirement of an imminent attack
in self-defence. In other words, it may now be possible to engage in a
pre-emptive strike in self-defence.
17
Having said a little about woman judge, I want to move on to
judging woman - Justice Wilson's contributions to the legal and social
construction of woman.
III. Judging woman
The starting point, I think, for her, is the common humanity of men
and women. "We are human beings first and foremost and only
secondarily male and female."' 8 Humanity is more basic than gender
and fundamental to our claim to equality. While not completely un-
controversial, 9 it is not unusual at this stage in our intellectual history
to link humanity and claims to equality.
16. [199014 W.W.R. 1.
17. It is difficult to say just how this will work out in practice, however, since the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, s. 34, still speaks of "[e]veryone who is unlawfully assaulted".
18. "Law in Society - The Principle of Sexual Equality", speech in Winnipeg, Manitoba, April
8, 1983, at 9.
19. Michael Tooley, e.g. takes issue with the common assumption, in Western society, that no
non-human animals are persons. "Decisions to Terminate Life and the Concept of a Person" in
John Ladd, ed., Ethical Issues Relating To Life and Death, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1979, at 92). See generally, Stanley and Roslind Godlovitch, eds., Animals, Men, and Morals,
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So, for instance, in her dissent in the provocation case of Hilfl, she
stressed that while the sex of the accused is relevant as part of the
context which helps us understand provocativeness, women and men
have to meet a common standard of self-control as an aspect of
equality of responsibility. 21 In her concurring judgment in Towne
Cinema Theatres Ltd?', she used an approach to the "undue exploita-
tion of sex" in obscenity offences which emphasised that persons and
groups can be stripped of their humanity - the human dimension of life
can be degraded to a sub-human or merely physical dimension.23 The
language is largely gender-neutral, but the idea is one that has only
recently found expression in the law, that women, the focus of much
pornography, are indeed human beings, whose degradation matters.
There are costs to an emphasis on common humanity, which
sometimes can resemble a liberal notion of equality divorced from the
context of the on-going social and economic subordination of women.
Wilson concurred with Lamer's dissent in Messier v. Delageu where
he expressed the view that while it used to be the case that an "ex-wife
would, more often than not, remain a burden to her former husband
indefinitely"5 , now " women cannot on the one hand claim equal
status without at the same time accepting responsibility for their own
upkeep." It was suggested that there are rare exceptions to this
approach, for instance, a divorced woman in her sixties without train-
ing or skills who had been dependent during a long married life - such
a woman may be "partially or totally unable psychologically ever to
assume financial responsibility for herself."27 Aside from exceptional
cases, the ideal is the "emancipation of former spouses".
(London: Taplinger, 1972). The argument has been made that both speciesism and racism
attempt to justify discrimination on the basis of morally irrelevant criteria. T. Regan and Peter
Singer, eds., Animal Rights and Human Obligations, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall,
1976).
20. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313.
21. Ibid., at 353.
22. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 494.
23. "mhe undue exploitation of sex...is the treatment of sex which in some fundamental way
dehumanizes the persons portrayed, and as a consequence, the viewers themselves." Ibid., at
523.
24. [19831 2 S.C.R. 401.
25. Ibid., at 420.
26. Ibid., at 421.
27. The language quoted with approval was from the Canada Law Reform Commission Working
Paper No.12, Maintenance on Divorce, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975), at 30.
28. Supra, note 24, at 426. Some attention has been paid to the fact that emancipation may mean
emancipation to relative poverty for women and relative affluence for men. See, e.g. Freda M.
Steel, "Alimony and Maintenance Awards" in Sheilah L Martin and Kathleen E. Mahoneyeds.,
Equality and Judicial Neutrality, (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), 155, at 163.
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However it should be said that Madame Justice Wilson does not let
her fundamental emphasis on common humanity lead to the assump-
tion of common experiences of life for men and women. She is aware
of both the reality of domination and of its connection to gender. Law
both plays a role in creating this and should respond to it.
An understanding of the most extreme form of domination on an
individual level was influential in Pare29, in which she delivered the
judgment of the Court. Pare had killed a child two minutes after
indecently assaulting him. The issue was whether the murder was first
degree, i.e. did the accused kill the child "while committing" the
indecent assault. 30 The Court rejected the literal interpretation as
acontextual, and found in the concept of unlawful domination a com-
mon theme uniting a particular class of first degree murder." The
murder represented an exploitation of power created by the underlying
crime and made the entire course of conduct a "single transaction".3 2
Of course, a recognition of domination does not at all require recogni-
tion that it could exist in structural forms associated with particular
groups of people such as women.
Such recognition of group-based, rather than individual, political,
social and economic hierarchies forms at least a part of her approach
to section 15 of the Charter.33 Again the approach is contextual. In
Andrews3 she said that the determination of whether a group falls into
a category analogous to those enumerated in section 15 is " not to be
made only in the context of the law which is subject to challenge but
rather in the context of the place of the group in the entire social,
political and legal fabric of our society." 35 As part of her case by case
approach to equality, she, delivering the unanimous judgment of the
Court in Turpin3 , thought that "most but perhaps not all cases [of
alleged discrimination] necessarily entail a search for disadvantage
that exists apart from and independent of the particular distinction
29. [198712 S.C.R. 619.
30. See what is now s.231(5) of the Criminal Code.
31. The present crimes in s. 231(5) are hijacking, sexual assault, kidnapping and forcible
confinement, and hostage taking.
32. Supra, note 29, at 633.
33. The Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. 1985, en.by the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), c. 11, as am. by
the Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1983, S1/84-102, Sch., in force June 21, 1984, Sch.
B, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
34. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
35. Ibid., at 152.
36. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.
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being challenged." 37 A section 15 decision therefore usually involves
a "search for indicia of discrimination such as stereotyping, historical
disadvantage or vulnerability to political and social prejudice."'
Can such indicia of discrimination be found with respect to women?
While there is a strong awareness of women as individuals 39 the view
that they can, as a collectivity, seems implicit in the world-view of
Madame Justice Wilson as expressed in her work as a whole. How-
ever, it is difficult to find one place where that idea is explicitly
expressed. She concurred in the unanimous judgment delivered by
Mr. Justice Dickson in Action Travail des Femmes v. Canadian Na-
tional Railway Co.4 . Here women were recognised as a disadvan-
taged group with respect to the employment situation and history at
CN Railway. In Lavallee she quoted a U.S.case referring to women's
long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.41
The maintenance cases are of course relevant to the question of
whether she approached legal issues bearing the inequality of women,
as a disadvantaged group, in mind. In Pelech42 , the question related to
the finality of a maintenance agreement given the physical, psycho-
logical, and economic difficulties of the ex-wife. The need to compen-
sate for gender-based inequality was contrasted with the need for
finality. Madame Justice Wilson expressed herself as being in sympa-
thy with the views of Matas J.A. in Ross4 3 :
...we have not yet reached the stage where we can safely say that
generally husbands and wives are equal, or nearly so, in earning capac-
ity, or where we can necessarily say that generally the responsibilities
of marriage have not disadvantaged the earning potential of the wife."
However, she did not share the view that this required the courts to
assume a supervisory role. This would "ultimately reinforce the very
bias he seeks to counteract."'45 She therefore came to the conclusion
37. Ibid., at 1332. Thus persons charged outside of Alberta who did not have the right to elect
trial by judge alone, did not constitute a disadvantaged group in Canadian society.
38. Ibid., at 1332.
39. See, e.g. "One Woman's Way to the Supreme Court", remarks made at the Women
Lawyer's Dinner, 22nd Australian Legal Convention, Brisbane, 1983.
40. [19891 1 S.C.R. 1114.
41. State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d° 548 (1977).
42. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801. Wilson delivered the judgment of herself, Dickson C.J., McIntyre,
Lamer and LeDain JJ.
43. (1984), 39 R.F.L. (2d) 51 (Man.C.A.).
44. Ibid., at 64.
45. Supra, note 42, at 849.
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that settlements should stand unless there existed some causal connec-
tion between the changed circumstances and the marriage. '
This presents a difficulty for those who are of the view that we
need to work toward significant improvements in the lives and status
of women. There is disagreement about how to achieve such improve-
ments. Certain goals may be uncontroversial. For instance, it would be
a good thing if women were safe in their homes and on the streets; it
would be a good thing if divorce were not a pathway to poverty for
women. Yet deciding on an appropriate and effective strategy, even
one that will not cause more harm, is more or less a leap in the dark. 7
A shared concern about the disadvantages of being a woman can
obviously produce different hunches about what is likely to produce
change in the long-run.
So far I have touched on two basic threads in her work - the belief
in a common humanity and recognition of disadvantage. But there are
many other aspects, both descriptive and normative, of her judicial
work, which tell us what it means to be a woman in her world-view.
A recent case provides a starting point. The law can take notice of
the fact that men and women are biologically different, even though
there are dangers involved. Thus in Hess', the old sex-specific of-
fence of statutory rape was found not to infringe section 15 of the
Charter. This was because rape, as legally-defined, could only be
committed by males. This seems obvious on one level, but quite
controversial on others, especially when one bears in mind, as Mad-
ame Justice Wilson did, that to be biologically female has been treated
by law as justifying disadvantage! 9
The Wilson majority in Hess did not adopt a liberal approach
which made it seem so obvious to some that statutory rape was the
paradigm offence which infringed section 15. Here old-fashioned
liberals (concemed with the protection of male interests) and liberal
feminists (concerned, and with good reason, that any biological dis-
tinction recognised by law will disadvantage women) could make
46. See also Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857.
47. Catharine MacKinnon refers to some of the problems in "Reflections on Sex Equality Under
the Law" (1991), 100 Yale Li. 1281, at 1293."What if the stereotype - such as women enjoy
rape-is not really true of anyone? What if, to the extent a stereotype is accurate, it is a product of
abuse, like passivity, or a survival strategy, like manipulativeness? What if, to the degree it is
real, it signals an imposed reality, like a woman's place is in the home? What if the stereotype is
ideologically injurious but materially helpfid..... Emphasis added.
48. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906.
49. The most famous illustrations might be Bliss v. Attorney-General of Canada, [1979] 1
S.C.R. 183, and Attorney-General v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349.
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common cause. Rather, she referred to her own approach to discrimi-
nation in Andrews and clearly intended to base her analysis on a
hierarchy rather than a differences approach. However, she did not go
on to actually utilize her own approach, which she could have done by
analysing the role of sexual assault in the subordination of young
women, the issue of whether the law should facilitate male access to
the sexuality of young women, and the social meaning of contracep-
tion according to which a good user of contraception can be seen as a
bad girl'. Instead biology was a substitute for an analysis of the social
disadvantage called for by Andrews. But the bottom line is clear. At
least for some purposes, women, and men, have gendered bodies.
But it is also clear that women are far from being just their bodies.
We can also find a strong sense of woman as moral actor with respect
to those bodies. Her judgment in Morgentaler 51 refers to the right to
reproduce or not to reproduce as "properly perceived as an integral
part of modem woman's struggle to assert her dignity and worth as a
human being."52  A woman is not an entity justifiably treated as a
means to an end, the passive object of decisions made by others, and
thus deprived of her essential humanity. The concept of woman is
evolving, in the sense that the rights that she bears as a human rights-
bearing entity, are evolving to meet her needs and aspirations. Hence
Wilson's judgment went beyond an analysis of whether the abortion
process was fundamentally unjust in a procedural sense and found
meaning for women, as women, in the Charter rights to liberty and
security of the person.
A powerful, and liberal, image in the judgment is that of liberty
and security as a fence surrounding the gendered individual. As well,
woman is not only autonomous vis-a-vis the state, but can shape her
own identity with respect to others by rejecting her inter-connectedness
with the foetus. But if the core of the judgment is liberal it is a radical
liberalism. The great aspirational Charter concepts are to be given a
meaning that treat women's claims to them as serious. The approach is
50. Cf. Catharine MacKinnon, "Introduction" (1981), 10 Capital University Law Reviewi at vi,
n.21. "Arguably, the practice of coercive male sexual initiation towards women, particularly
those perceived as vulnerable, targets young girls, even more than it does all women. This,
together with women's lack of access to meaningful consent, which may vary with age (as well
as economic resources and other factors) would criticize the social context of gender inequality
that situates women and men nonsimilarly in the sexual arena. Such an argument would produce
a very different conception of the injury of rape upon which to support a sex specific statutory
prohibition.....
51. [19881 1 S.C.R.30.
52 Ibid., at 172.
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not to construct, say, liberty, in a way that is responsive to male
persons (e.g. persons who do not have to make decisions about foe-
tuses growing inside their own bodies) and then, applying liberal
notions of equality, allow women to have the same liberty. Rather,
liberty is constructed from the ground up recognising that some per-
sons with liberty claims will have to make such decisions.
It is trite of course to say that liberty has no pre-ordained meaning.
It, and other concepts, are vessels, empty but with some shape, which
have to be given content by the courts. In playing her role in this
process, Madame Justice Wilson treats as significant the liberty claims
of women.
I believe that the decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy is
essentially a moral decision, a matter of conscience....The question is:
whose conscience? Is the conscience of the woman to be paramount or
the conscience of the state? 3
Nevertheless, the bottom line in Morgentaler is that it is the
conscience of the state once protection of the foetus becomes a press-
ing and substantial concern. The bright shining woman as autonomous
moral actor with respect to reproductive decisions is an image that
fades. Her essential humanity, reflected in her claims to liberty and
security, fades as the foetus grows and the use of her body as a means
to an end becomes more justifiable.
The fading woman in Morgentaler can perhaps be contrasted with
the woman constructed in Eves , who cannot be sterilized without her
consent. However, it is difficult to say whether Wilson, in joining the
unanimous judgment, expressed a view that is consistent, or a con-
trast, with Morgentaler. The state can force a woman to bear a child at
some stage of the development of the foetus, but a court, in exercising
its parens patriae jurisdiction, cannot force a woman with a mental
disability not to have a child. So control is envisaged in one case but
not the other. Another way of looking at it, however, is that both cases
contemplate the possibility that because of state decisions, women
may bear children that they did not exercise a moral choice to have.
This crucial aspect of womanhood - whether a woman is a person
who is morally autonomous with respect to whether her body may be
used for reproductive purposes - is of course still unsettled. Tremblay
v. Daigle55 , in which Wilson joined a unanimous Court, explicitly left
53. Ibid., at 175-76.
54. [19861 2 S.C.R. 388.
55. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530.
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open the question of whether a woman is a distinctive type of person
who can be compelled to use her body to save the life of another
(woman as ultimate altruist). The actual decision was that there were
no substantive rights on which an injunction barring an abortion could
be founded. That means that it is conceivable that a legislature could
try to create such substantive rights, inevitably raising a constitutional
issue. This basic question about the nature of womanhood in Canadian
law would then have to be answered.
So all we can say at the moment is that a woman is a person whose
constitutional status with respect to whether she can be forced to
continue a pregnancy is uncertain. This sounds like a bit of familiar
law, but I think it may have more significance as an aspect of psycho-
logical reality. I, as a woman, am a person of uncertain constitutional
status. I may be living (and writing academic papers) in a community
which expresses its respect for my essential humanity, my non-means-
to-endedness, or I may not. Until I know the answer I lack crucial
information about what woman really means.
However, while pregnant, consensually or otherwise, a woman is
entitled to be free of discrimination on that basis. Again, Wilson
joined a unanimous Court, which stated, in overruling Bliss6, in
Brooks v. Canada Safeway:
7
That those who bear children and benefit society as a whole thereby
should not be economically or socially disadvantaged seems to bespeak
the obvious....it is unfair to impose all of the costs of pregnancy upon
one half of the population...: 8
The decision was explicitly influenced by the changing social and
economic context.
Over ten years have elapsed since the decision in Bliss. During that
time there have been profound changes in women's labour force par-
ticipation.5 9
and
The Safeway plan was no doubt developed...."in an earlier era when
women were openly presumed to play a minor and temporary role in
the work-force".'
56. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183.
57. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219.
58. Ibid., at 1243, per Dickson Ci.
59. Ibid., at 1243.
60. Ibid., at 1244.
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So not only does the case tell us that women are not fair game for
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, but that the work-force is
made up of a variety of normal individuals of both genders and
different reproductive conditions.
The image of women as workers outside the home is also clear in
Janzen61 , where again Wilson joined a unanimous Court, in recognis-
ing that sexual harassment is discrimination; that it is an abuse of
sexual and economic power, that women face the greatest risk; and
that this is an attack on their dignity and self-respect as a human being.
The Court uses, as part of the academic context, Professor Aggarwal's
argument that sexual harassment is used in a sexist society to "under-
score women's difference from, and by implication, inferiority with
respect to, the dominant male group" and" to remind women of their
inferior ascribed status".
62
One area of intense topical interest relates to the messages about
women in the law of sexual assault. Such signals are very significant.
A newcomer to Canada who noticed that some women had a stamp on
their foreheads - lets say it was W for whore or OT for open territory
- and that these women were sexually accessible to men irrespective of
their wishes, might come to some quite obvious conclusions about
what it means to be a woman in Canada. It would not help that other
women had another stamp - say RHWSM[P for respectible hetero-
sexual woman with a single male partner- that they could have if they
obeyed certain rules and therefore were only sexually accessible to
one man. That observer might look in vain for a SAW stamp -sexually
autonomous woman. We might not have such obvious ways of dis-
playing the rules about the sexual accessibility of women, but they
nevertheless can be found in our laws, e.g. those relating to question-
ing about sexual history, which have traditionally focussed on what
kind of stamp to put on the complainant's forehead.
In her dissenting judgment in Konkin63 , the issue was whether the
complainant could be questioned about her sexual conduct after the
alleged rape. The conviction of the accused had been overturned by
the Alberta Court of Appeal because the trial judge had excluded this
evidence as irrelevant. The majority of the Supreme Court agreed, but
Wilson, Beetz and Chouinard dissented. The complainant was not to
61. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252.
62. Ibid., at 1285, quoting Arjun P. Aggarwal, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, (l'oronto:
Butterworths, 1987). It is interesting that in both Brooks and Janzen, the role of Madame Justice
Wilson was to join in the path-breaking judgments of Chief Justice Dickson.
63. [1983] 1 S.C.R. 388.
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be subjected to a "humiliating and devastating inquiry at trial" into
irrelevant evidence which had to do with the trauma of the rape rather
than the guilt or innocence of the accused.
It should be said that the dissent in Konkin unsuccessfully tried to
protect women from irrelevant questions, but was not based on an
argument that questions about sexual conduct were never relevant. It
is hard to say whether that flowed from the legislation of the day,
which assumed that it could be relevant, so it is difficult to extrapolate
from Konkin to the fascinating question of what a Wilson judgment in
Seaboyer' would have held. In this recent case, the Supreme Court of
Canada struck down, as inconsistent with an accused person's right to
a fair trial, section 276 of the Criminal Code, which limits questioning
about a complainant's sexual history.
One group of women who are particularly vulnerable to being
labelled as sexually accessible is prostitutes6. They may have diffi-
culty achieving legal recognition of their victimization. Can the law
also label them criminals for communicating for sexual purposes? In
dissent, with Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube, in Reference Re ss.193
and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code , Madame Justice Wilson said
that the latest attempt by Parliament to do this was an unconstitutional
infringement of freedom of expression. What image of women who do
this kind of work can be found in her dissent? Prostitution is a
degrading way to earn a living, yet prostitutes are not portrayed as
victims but as economic actors with expression rights. Again the
image of woman as holder of constitutional status is very clear.
Of all the Wilson cases, Lavallee 7 may be the richest source of
messages about womanhood. First of all Lavallee conveys what I
think is a radical message that women's lives are valuable and entitled
to be protected, something I would not have taken for granted. It also
raises the question of the connection between what it means to be a
woman and what it means to be reasonable.
Lavallee was acquitted because of a successful self-defence argu-
ment. The core of self defence doctrine is the concept of reasonable-
64. (1991), 83 D.LR. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.). However, Wilson does say in Konkin that evidence of
a pre- and post-offence pattern of conduct would be relevant, at 402.
65. See A.W. Burgess and LL. Holmstrom, "The Prostitute" in A.W. Burgess and A. Lazare,
eds. Community Mental Health:Target Populations, (Englewood Cliffs,NJ.: Prentice-Hail,1976).
66. [19901 1 S.C.R. 1123.
67. [1990] 4 W.W.R. (S.C.C.) For a more comprehensive discussion see Donna Martinson,
Marilyn MacCrimmon, Isabel Grant and Christine Boyle, "A Forum on Lavallee v. R.: Women
and Self-Defence" (1991), 25 UB.C.,.R. 23.
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ness. It is trite to say that reasonableness is a very vague concept
which will be given meanings in particular historical and cultural
contexts. It is at least theoretically conceivable that in our time and
place it would be seen as impossible to be a woman, to kill a man, and
to be reasonable at the same time. Conversely it is theoretically possi-
ble for a woman always to be seen as reasonable if she kills a man.
Since we are somewhat familiar with our own time and place, we
would be surprised to find either of these extremes if we studied the
law of self-defence. We might rather expect to find something in
between, although it would be naive to expect the perfect balance.
What I read Madame Justice Wilson, speaking for the majority, as
saying in Lavallee is that the content of the concept of reasonableness
may have been tilted toward the end of the spectrum at which there is
difficulty in being seen as a woman and being seen as reasonable at the
same time. She says that the "definition of what is reasonable must be
adapted to circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the world
inhabited by the hypothetical "reasonable man". Further, it was noted
that the factor of gender can be germane to the assessment of what is
reasonable. Thus fact finders must attempt to decide what is reason-
able for a person who belongs to a group, in this case women, who
lack training in repelling a male assailant, who have suffered a long
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination, who due to their size,
strength and socialization, are typically no match for men in hand to
hand combat, and who have personally suffered abuse at the hands of
the deceased.
Whenever I have discussed Lavallee with students, I detect some
tendency to see the case as an example of the subjectivisation of the
objective test of reasonableness. In other words, assuming a spectrum
of tests with objective at one end and subjective on the other, the
reasonable man, or in more modem terms, the reasonable person test,
is at the objective end, while the reasonable battered woman repre-
sents movement toward the subjective end. Those who approve an
objective test in the first place express concern with this dilution.
However, I see Lavallee as recognising that everyone is gendered and
that a reasonable man test is no more or no less objective than a
reasonable woman. Whatever the sex of the accused, the issue is, as
stated by the majority, what (s)he reasonably perceived, given her
situation and her experience. The point of Lavallee is not that we have
to change our construction of reasonableness to suit women as a kind
68. Mr. Justice Sopinka concurred in the TeSUIL
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of exception to the general rule, but that we have to be careful not to
give meaning to concepts such as reasonableness, using a male model.
The point is that womanhood and reasonableness are just as consistent
as maleness and reasonableness.
Lavallee also touched on the duty to retreat issue. The reference
was brief, and somewhat obscure, but the case seems to indicate that a
woman does not have to retreat from her home rather than kill her
abusive partner.69 In other words, the law, while being gender-neutral,
is not saying in effect that if you are a woman and you are battered you
are the person who must abandon your home. 0 To my mind, this
conjures up an image of a woman, albeit driven to desperation, who
stands her ground, and defends herself. Cultural standards of appropri-
ate male and female behaviour are deeply implicated in the legal
approach to the issue.
I sense that to Madame Justice Wilson, the question was quite
straightforward, the answer being found in our common humanity.
Until Lavallee the law apparently said that "a man's home is his
castle", and so there is no duty to retreat in the face of an attack.7t
Lavallee explicitly says that it is a woman's home too, thus rejecting
gender stereotypes in this context. What those stereotypes might be is
obvious. They could be crudely summarized as real men don't run
away, but women do.
69. The majority were dealing with the alternatives to self-help when they stated, at 29-30: "I
emphasize at this juncture that it is not for the jury to pass judgment on the fact that an accused
battered woman stayed in the relationship. Still less is it entitled to conclude that she forfeited her
right to self-defence for having done so. I would also point out that traditional self-defence
doctrine does not require a person to retreat from her home instead of defending herself.... A
man's home may be his castle but it is also the women's home even if it seems to her more like
a prison in the circumstances." What I understand by this is that the law has said that it is
reasonable to stay in your home and kill an attacker rather than choose a safe retreat. What
Lavallee does is suggest, quite fairly, that this applies to battered women too. Thus it would not
be open to a fact finder to decide that it was unreasonable for a battered woman to kill her partner
because she could instead have left her home. The judgment is not entirely clearabout this, since,
in the very next paragraph, the sentence appears. "Iff...the jury is satisfied that the accused had a
reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm and felt incapable of escape, it must
ask itself what the "reasonable person" would do in such a situation." (Emphasis added) If there
is no duty to retreat from one's home, then the accused's feelings about the possibility of escape
do not seem to be relevant. The law is not clear and for this reason alone it would appear that the
Court will have to return to the issue of whether the reasonable person should chose a safe retreat
over the use of deadly force.
70. As it did in State v. Bobbitt 415 So.2d.724(Fla.1982).
71. The few Canadian cases have held that there is no duty to retreat from one's home, but one
Alberta case went on to say that the same approach would be taken even if the accused were not
at home. This at least has the virtue of refusing to tilt self-defence doctrine toward the protection
of those who are recognised by the legal system as having a home. See R. v. Deegan (1979), 49
C.C.C.(2d) 417.
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One does not have to go far to find evidence of a connection
between the rule that there is no duty to retreat from one's home and
the social construction of masculinity. However, the origin of the rule
may have had more to do with notions of property than with masculin-
ity. The old English case that is usually cited in this context is Semayne
in 1605. 72 It seems to be the source of the expression that a man's
home is his castle, used in Lavallee. It is authority for the view that a
man need not retreat from but can defend his home. Even though the
word man is used and we might assume that the rule is designed to set
standards of masculine behaviour, we should be careful not to project
our knowledge of more modem gender roles back onto seventeenth
century England. At various times in English history, men would have
been away from home at war or doing other things and many women,
particularly upper class women, would have been responsible for
running homes and large estates. A legal norm of defending rather
than retreating from a home might have had a lot to do with standards
of behaviour for women as well as men and with the protection of
property interests of absent males.
It is in more recent times that we can find clearer evidence that
the law is being used to construct the idea of male virtue, what male
honour requires. We find the expression "true man" in 19th century
U.S. cases, for instance Erwin v. State.73 "A true man, who is without
fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who by violence or
surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous bodily
harm. ' '74
What little literature there is supports the idea that what has been at
stake in the development of the law on retreat is the construction of
masculinity. J.H. Beale, in a 1903 article,75 tells us that the notion of
honour points in two directions. The "feeling at the bottom of the
argument [that there should be no duty to retreat] is one beyond all
law: it is the feeling that is responsible for the duel, for war, for
lynching; the feeling that leads a jury to acquit the slayer of his wife's
paramour; the feeling which would compel a true man to kill the
ravisher of his daughter." However, Beale goes on to argue that a
72. (1605). 77 E.R. 194 (K.B.).
73. 29 Ohio St. 95 (1876), at 103.
74. The U.S.Supreme Court quoted Erwin v. State with approval in the case of Beard v. U.S.
158 U.S. 550 (1895). Erwin hints at but does not tell us that it might also have something to do
with reasonableness for white people as well as men, since it starts: "The plaintiff in error, a
white man and not an Indian". This person, Babe Beard, was charged with murdering Will Jones,
also referred to as a white person and not an Indian.
75. "Retreat from a Murderous Assault" (1903), 16 Harv.L.R. 567, at 581.
The Role of the Judiciary in the Work of Mme Justice Wilson 259
really honourable man would regret the cowardice of a retreat, but
after the excitement of the contest was past, would regret the blood of
a fellow - being on his hands even more. Even where there was a
debate, both sides were couched in terms of male honour, and it is
clear that the issue was seen from a male perspective.
It is difficult to be confident, since there are not very many self-
defence cases, but it seems plausible that the rule that there is no duty
to retreat is based on the idea that it would be cowardly, not manly, to
retreat in the face of violence.
Conversely, expectations of appropriate womanly behaviour, in
my view, might be the opposite. Indeed women might be expected not
to get themselves in a situation where they would have to run away in
the first place - run away in advance, so to speak.
Lavallee makes it clear that this double standard should not be
reinforced by law, although it leaves us with a difficult question.
Certainly, liberal notions of equality dictate that the rule, whatever it
is, applies to all accused persons, irrespective of gender, but that
sidesteps the question of what the law should be. Courts might depart
from the present legal rule that there is not a duty to retreat, and
promote instead a norm of non-violence as both manly and wom-
anly.76 My first reaction to this aspect of Lavallee was that the
promotion of non-violence is one of the things I would expect women
judges to bring to their work.
On reflection, however, I think that it is very important that the law
says that part of what it means to be a woman is that one has no duty
to retreat from violence in one's home. What was practically a throwa-
way line reveals a profound awareness of context. A law which said
that you must retreat rather than defend yourself would ignore the
reality that for battered women there is no safe place to which they can
retreat.77
Ideally, of course, what I would like to see is a body of law which
stressed both the manliness of non-violence and the safety of women.
The significance of Lavallee lies for me in the fact that it challenges us
to examine the content that we put into such flexible legal concepts as
reasonableness and such cultural constructs as manliness in self de-
fence and womanliness in judging.
76. Indeed we might be experiencing a cultural shift toward the perception of non-violence as
manly. I am thinking here of the events at Oka. Both the Canadian Army and the Mohawk
Warriors claimed the virtue of a non-violent response to violence.
77. See "Forum on Lavallee", supra, note 67, at 65.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, how can we as women see ourselves in the Supreme
Court decisions of Madame Justice Wilson? I have tried to use ideo-
logical constructs as little as possible as devices for structuring de-
scription, presenting tensions and contrasts. However it seems to me
that Wilson does what Professor Greschner advocates in her article
"We Don't Need Another Hero"." She recognises women's separate-
ness and equalness but also the fact that the self, particularly the
judicial self, is partly constituted by the community context.
What I have tried to do instead is paint a picture. Her contribution
to this picture is that women are workers, pregnant, moral decision-
makers, albeit within limits, the speakers of constitutionally-protected
speech, but primarily as human beings around whose lives major legal
ideas such as liberty, equality, expression, and reasonableness have to
be constructed.
She has helped us think about what it means to be a woman and
about what it means to be a judge.
78. Supra, note 14.
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